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reflected in the debt-to-export ratio—will not be met.
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1 Introduction
Tanzania in the past six years has convinced donors that it is serious about economic
reforms. While growth has increased, it is still too low to have much impact on poverty
in an economy where population growth is thought to be between 2.8 and 3 per cent per
annum. Indeed, scattered and limited budget surveys from the 1990s suggest increasing
poverty levels—both income and non-income—which of course make popular support
for continuing reforms difficult to uphold. Preliminary results from the household
budget survey (HBS) 2000 suggest, however, that non-income poverty has remained
virtually constant.1 If correct, this means that the claim often made—that the poor in
Tanzania were made worse of by economic reforms in the 1990s—can been rejected.
Obviously, the pace at which Tanzania is currently travelling, about 5 per cent per
annum in real terms, is far too slow to make a sizeable impact in the short or medium
run. Hence the importance of Tanzania reaching the HIPC decision point in April 2000
and possibly the completion point later this calendar year: this could make the
difference needed to speed up poverty reduction, both through the impact on growth and
the freeing of government resources.
In theory, debt relief reduces poverty through three distinct channels. First, debt relief
may increase economic growth. The idea is that debt relief stimulates private (foreign or
domestic) investments and possibly international credit ratings. This may increase
economic growth, thereby accelerating poverty reduction. Second, relief of government
debt releases resources which the government can use for increased spending on, say,
social sectors, which is likely to have an immediate impact on non-income poverty.
Third, debt relief may be used to change policies. In particular, donors (or creditors)
may buy reforms with debt relief, making the economic environment more conducive to
growth and private initiative.
While Tanzania has improved its growth rate mainly due to economic reforms, the
impact on poverty has been limited essentially because of two factors. First is the
pattern of growth, which currently is biased to sectors with weak linkages to other
sectors and with limited participation of the poor. Examples include mining and
tourism. This implies relatively low poverty elasticities. Second is the institutional
structure designed for delivering social services: it is weak, often characterized by
inertia and leakages, and hampered by inadequate resources for non-salary recurrent
expenditures.
HIPC will certainly help to free government resources: it is likely that it will be more or
less fully additional. However, Tanzania’s external gap remains, so external borrowing
will continue. One implication of this—not always appreciated in the literature—is that
the external debt will continue to grow. In fact, the decision point document calculates
that the net present value (NPV) of the external debt in 2015 will be three times as large
as the NPV of the external debt in 1999, the year before Tanzania started enjoying
1 The preliminary results from the household budget survey have been published and show some
inconsistency with regard to income poverty. Most likely this is because of seasonality: only three
months’ have been covered so far. Non-income poverty indicators are less likely to be sensitive to
seasons and show some improvement (or at least no deterioration) when compared to the 1991/92
HBS. Policy conclusions from the available results are very cautious and most analysts recommend
adopting a wait-and-see attitude in expectations of the final results, due in early 2002.2
HIPC-relief. The key assumption, then, is fast economic growth—if rapid enough, the
large debt in 2015 will be sustainable even though it will be much larger in dollar terms.
This, in turn, leads to the question of how new loans will be used; by whom, in what
sector and for what purpose?
The main argument of this paper is that Tanzania is not likely to reach the projections
for growth, exports or poverty reductions as set out in various policy documents—
including the PRGF (i.e., the agreement with the IMF, and the most important policy
document), the decision point document (DPD) and the poverty reduction strategy paper
(PRSP)—so the situation, say, in 2010 is likely be less bright that projected there. The
key question is of course: what happens then? The purpose of the paper is to provide
some foundation for asking that question.
In section 2, I briefly describe aspects of Tanzania’s progress to date, including the
multilateral debt fund, which in Tanzania has worked very much (although with fewer
conditionalities, and no debt stock reductions) as the HIPC. Section 3 describes the
scenario projected in the two core documents, the decision point document and the
PRSP, and confronts this with historical performance. In addition, some calculations on
a ‘what-if’ basis are presented. Section 4 concludes.
2 Growth, debt and the HIPC Initiative
2.1 The evolution of the debt in the 1990s
Tanzania has followed the same pattern in the 1990s as many other highly indebted
African countries—to increasingly rely on concessional finance. Coupled with five
successful (in the sense that relief and/or reschedulings were agreed) Paris Club
negotiations, this has had several implications for the evolution of Tanzania’s external
debt. As Table 1 shows, debt concessionality has increased, as has the share of
multilateral debt (the latter largely because bilateral debt relief) and the conditions of
new commitments have improved (at least from 1993) on all four of the conventional
indicators of softness.
In fact, Table 1 suggests 1993 to be something of a watershed in Tanzania’s external
debt policy and position. Most trends change drastically around that year. Both the debt
ratio and the debt service ratio start to decline, net transfers on debt become positive and
interest payments (measured in dollars) start to decline. Admittedly, some indicators
change later. Thus, for instance, total disbursements decline from 1990 to 1996 when
the trend is reversed. Still, 1993 is a watershed, because of two reasons: it was the year
when the government of Tanzania (GOT) formulated its first external debt strategy and
it was the year when the forex regime was changed and the currency started to be traded
in twice-weekly auctions. Prior to that, private firms or parastatals that wished to service
their external debt did so by paying debt service in local currency to the Bank of
Tanzania (BoT), but the BoT could not service the debt because of lack of foreign
exchange. So the period before 1993 saw increases not only in accumulation of arrears,
but also in the proportion of the debt guaranteed by the government as the BoT in effect
had taken over the debt by accepting debt service in local currency.3
Table 1
Debt and debt servicing 1990-99, Selected years
(US$ million except as indicated)
1990 1993 1996 1999
Long-term debt (US$ million) 5,625 5,671 6,127 6,628
Flows on debt
Disbursements 334 241 244 338
Principal repayments 116 106 168 123
Net flows on debt 233 111 145 225
Interest payments 62 116 104 71
Net transfers on debt 171 -5 41 154
Arrears
Principal arrears 818 1,134 1,608 1,171
o/w: Official 629 905 1 324 998
Interest arrears 405 708 901 870
o/w: Official 280 568 726 760
Debt indicators
Debt ratio (%) 171 188 126 91
Debt service ratio (%) 33 29 19 16
Short-term debt (%) 8 12 14 13
Concessional debt (%) 54 60 61 73
Multilateral debt (%) 32 37 39 41
Average terms of new commitments
Interest (%) 1.2 1.9 1.3 1.3
Maturity (years) 34.7 35.7 35.4 40.1
Grace period (years) 9.2 8.7 9.2 10.3
Grant element (%) 71.8 68.0 72.7 77.6
Source: World Bank (2001; Vol. 2).
Table 2
Use of external debt
US$ million and per cent
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
BOP support 27.3 25.5 23.1 23.2 23.0 18.7
Transport 19.2 19.5 20.3 20.3 20.3 21.5
Agriculture 14.7 14.6 14.4 14.2 14.6 15.6
Energy and mining 10.0 10.9 11.3 12.3 12.5 13.2
Industries 9.5 9.2 8.6 8.2 7.7 7.8
Social welfare 3.2 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.9
Finance 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.6 3.3 3.7
Others 11.8 12.3 14.2 13.7 12.9 13.5
Source: Danielson and Mjema (2001; Table 10).4
Table 2 depicts the use of loans by sector. The bulk is used in infrastructure—most of
what is designated ‘agriculture’ in the table is, in reality, investments in rural roads,
such as energy and transportation. In addition, between a quarter and a fifth of all loans
are for balance of payment support. This includes all IMF credits and all programme
loans from the World Bank. It is noticeable, however, that over half of all external loans
are not being used for transport, agriculture and mining, the sectors that are often
singled out as growth bottle-necks. This is a point to which I shall return below.
2.2 The role of the MDF/PRBS
While Tanzania has had a large and growing external debt for a long time, the relation
between debt and debt servicing on the one hand and the ability to fight poverty on the
other became clearer after 1995 when Benjamin Mkapa was elected president in the first
multi-party elections ever. This event motivated, after some years of observation,
Bigsten and Danielson (2001) to ask whether the ugly duckling would finally grow up.
Mkapa emerged as a keen and determined reformer, sometimes even outdoing the
international financial institutions (IFIs). Consequently, as honouring debt contracts was
very important in Mkapa’s strategy, arrears were paid at an increasing rate and no new
arrears (with one exception; see below) were accumulated. In addition, implementation
of the cash budget in 1996 made the connection even clearer. The system, implemented
to curb inflation and install some fiscal discipline into line ministries, made a clear list
of priorities of expenditures. Debt servicing came first, followed by payment of salaries,
and then everything else. Since non-income poverty is partly measured through access
to education and health facilities, the cash budget initially decreased budgeted amounts
of non-salary items to these sectors. Funds for maintenance, textbooks, medications and
so on fell sharply. In addition, counterpart funds—the resources the government puts
into donor-funded projects in order to increase ‘ownership’—became virtually
unavailable, so implementation of donor-funded projects fell drastically. The servicing
of debt, and in particular multilateral debt, came into focus. Not only was it observed
that this was the only type of debt on which the government could not default without
terribly harmful consequences for future external financing (assuming that the GOT
would have reneged on its debt strategy), but also that debt servicing consumed sizeable
amounts of the government’s resources. Interest payments on external loans accounted
in 1996 for almost 11 per cent of total government expenditures.
This is the background for the multilateral debt fund (MDF). While bilateral donors had
been providing debt relief through the 5th dimension since the late 1980s, there had
been no coordinated efforts and the MDF can be seen as an attempt to create a
mechanism for coordination and policy dialogue.
The construction of the MDF was very simple. Donors paid forex into an account at the
Bank of Tanzania. The government withdrew funds as needed, i.e., as multilateral debts
fell due. The condition stipulated by donors was that the government agreed to protect
priority sectors, in the sense that these sectors should receive full funding as allocated in
the budget.2 Progress, including pledges, disbursement of funds into the MDF and
2 It deserves to be pointed out, however, that there is no guarantee that all local currency funds released
through the MDF are being used for social sectors. While some documents (notably the MDF/PRBS
Technical Note) suggest that all local currency resources should be used for priority sectors, no such
guarantees can be made: due to fungibility, it is impossible to trace resources and only broad
conditions (as those agreed) can be binding: indeed, as long as total budgetary allocations to social
sectors exceed the resources put in by donors, no ear-marking is possible.5
withdrawals, were reviewed in quarterly meetings between the government and donors;
this was also an opportunity for policy dialogue.
The system had several advantages. First, it was simple and thus transparent and
relatively easy to monitor. Second, triggers were built in. Funds were earmarked for
multilateral debt servicing and thus the government could withdraw funds only to the
extent that it was required by the debt structure. Third, monitoring was inexpensive as
the annual Public Expenditure Review exercise recorded budgetary allocations to sectors
and did some expenditure tracking. Fourth, the system encouraged cooperation, both
between donors and between donors and the government. While the government decides
annually on priority sectors, donors have reserved the right to select sectors from those
prioritized by the government. Consequently, while government priorities govern the
allocation of resources, donor priorities are also heeded. Fifth, as disbursement was not
linked to activities by the recipient—i.e., money could ‘rest’ in the account—no
incentives were created for donors to circumvent the government in order to make
disbursements timely to their own schedule.
When Tanzania reached the decision point under the HIPC Initiative in April 2000, it
started to receive interim relief (i.e., relief on flows, but no stock reductions) and the
remaining multilateral debt service was not sufficient to absorb MDF funds. The MDF
was then transformed into a facility for budgetary support, the poverty reduction budget
support facility (PRBS), that was set up on terms similar to the MDF. The most
important difference between the MDF and the PRBS is that in the latter there is no
built-in mechanism that triggers government use of the funds, so funds are used on an
‘as-needed’ basis instead. The condition of protecting social sectors and the quarterly
meetings remain, however.
Table 3 shows actual allocations to social sectors under the MDF, both as a percentage
of budgeted amounts and in millions of Shillings (in constant prices). Allocations to
personal emoluments (PE) have been above target since early 1999 and with occasional
blips so have allocations to other charges (OC). Consequently, the MDF/PRBS is likely
to have contributed to larger actual allocations for social sectors, particularly for other
charges. Under the cash budget system, other charges are treated as a residual, and even
if OC allocations to priority sector are given priority within other charges, fluctuations
and uncertainty in government income, both with regard to tax revenue and external
funds, made planning difficult, and all sectors experienced frequent shortfalls of funds
prior to the MDF.
However, things are not necessarily as bright as conventionally assumed. Table 4 shows
allocations to education, broken down by type of expenditure and type of education.
The total budget for all types of education declined between 1998 and 1999 and—in
particular, since this has been a concern among donors and government alike—the
expenditure of other charges per student declines, or at least shows violent swings for
the entire period for which data are available.6
Table 3
Allocations to social sectors in per cent of budgeted amounts
and in millions of Shillings in December 1994 prices
Per cent of budgeted amounts Actual allocations, millions of TSh
Year-quarter Personal emoluments Other charges Personal emoluments Other charges
1998-IV 97 156 5,205 4,943
1999-I 98 132 4,779 3,664
1999-II 101 102 4,974 2,838
1999-III 133 101 6,824 3,864
1999-IV 133 61 6,759 2,277
2000-I 132 116 6,145 3,993
2000-II 132 122 6,192 4,248
2000-III 104 99 6,751 5,195
2000-IV 109 104 7,011 5,298
2001-I 108 109 6,849 5,557
Source: Reports prepared for the quarterly MDF/PRBS meetings; CPI deflator from BoT (2001: Table 7).
Table 4
The education budget, 1996-99
in December 1994 prices
1996 1997 1998 1999
Primary education
Total budget (TSh million) 49,792 45,678 43,094 38,827
Personal emoluments (TSh million) 48,181 44,392 41,418 36,274
Other charges (TSh mn) 1,610 1,285 1,676 1,542
Personal emoluments (% of budget) 97 97 96 96
Other charges per student (TSh) 416 327 414 370
Secondary education
Total budget (TSh mn) 5,772 4,865 5,563 4,291
Personal emoluments (TSh mn) 4,234 4,004 3,241 2,802
Other charges (TSh mn) 1,537 860 2,378 1,488
Personal emoluments (% of budget) 73 82 58 65
Other charges per student (TSh) 16,699 8,838 19,925 12,005
Teacher education
Total budget (TSh mn) 1,445 1,391 1,676 1,202
Personal emoluments (TSh mn) 1,023 1,068 982 845
Other charges (TSh mn) 422 323 694 357
Personal emoluments (% of budget) 71 77 59 70
Other charges per student (TSh) 25,742 24,287 21,474 33,972
Source: Calculated from Public Expenditure Review (1999); Price index from BoT (2000: Table 1.19).7
2.3 Growth and poverty reduction
Despite positive growth in per capita incomes in the past years, several observers report
deteriorating social indicators and possibly increasing levels of poverty in the 1990s. It
deserves to be noted, however, that most observations are projections based on
household surveys conducted in 1991 and 1993. Less comprehensive studies that cover
more recent periods are available and they tend to confirm the trends projected from the
earlier studies.3
In any case, it seems established that social indicators have deteriorated in the 1990s; in
particular, primary school enrolment has fallen in the 1990s; infant and under-five
mortality rates show a slight increase; and evidence of child malnutrition (both stunting
and wasting) show no improvement over the past decade.4 The poverty reduction
strategy paper, generated by the government in response to HIPC decision point
conditions, suggests that poverty appears to have decreased during 1983-91 and
increased in the following decade. Moreover, poverty in Tanzania can be characterized
in five dimensions (PRSP: 7-8):
- Poverty is largely a rural phenomenon;
- The poor are concentrated in subsistence agriculture;
- Urban poverty is wide-spread and increasing;
- Vulnerable groups include the young, the old and large families; and
- While female-headed households do not have lower average incomes than male-
headed, women are generally poorer than men.
These observations lead to two reflections. First, since poverty is a rural phenomenon5 it
has to be fought in rural areas in general and in particular in subsistence agriculture.
Second, since poverty appears to have increased in the 1990s—a period with positive
per capita growth rates—the links between growth and poverty reduction are more
complex than conventionally assumed.
The two reflections are interrelated. If poverty is a rural phenomenon and at the same
time poverty has increased while the economy as a whole has grown, it means that
growth has been concentrated in sectors or geographical areas where the poor do not
3 Sarris and van der Brink (1993); World Bank (1993), World Bank (1996). Later and less
comprehensive studies include Narayan (1997) and two (unpublished) studies carries out by REPOA,
one using the same format at the 1991 household budget survey covering households in rural Ruvuma,
Dodoma and Mwanza, and one survey covering peri-urban households around Dar es Salaam. The
1991 household budget survey and the 1993 Human Resources Development Survey are extensively
discussed in TAKWIMU (2000). The state of knowledge of poverty in Tanzania per 1996 is outlined
in Danielson (1996).
4 One major reason for deteriorating social indicators is, of course, the cash budget coupled with limited
success in raising additional revenue; another one is delays in protecting social sector budget
allocations.
5 While urban poverty is wide-spread and increasing, it is likely to be a consequence of deteriorating
conditions in rural areas and consequently can be expected to decline as poverty is successfully fought
in rural areas.8
benefit. In other words, economic growth is an unequal process and it would seem likely
that an initial increase in income inequality is to be expected as a consequence of
economic growth.6
Obviously, the poverty alleviation impact of a certain rate of growth will be different
depending on the pattern of growth. It depends both on how the trickle-down process
works and on how income distribution is affected. In addition, to properly measure the
poverty alleviation impact of growth, we need several successive budget surveys which
ideally should be designed so as to make results commensurable. As noted above, both
major surveys are from the early 1990s and likely to be too close in time to allow for
dynamic inferences. In addition, their design is dissimilar.
However, it is possible to calculate the poverty impact of growth from the available
information, if only under rather restrictive assumptions. This can be used as a baseline
result, and the impact of various possible scenarios may be calculated. Table 5 provides
information on the poverty elasticities for the two major budget surveys disaggregated
by geographical region. It is important to keep in mind that these elasticities—i.e., the
percentage change in poverty (the population below a poverty threshold) when mean
income increases by one per cent—are calculated for unchanged income inequality.
Typically, this is not a realistic assumption and, indeed, it was argued above that in
Tanzania poverty has increased in the 1990s precisely because growth has increased
inequalities. Hence, the results in the table should be interpreted as a base for comparing
simulations, nothing else.
Note that elasticities have been calculated against two different poverty thresholds—
food poverty and basic needs poverty. The latter includes, apart from food, non-food
items regarded as necessities. These include consumer durables, health and education,
and other non-durables (details are in TAKWIMU 2000: Ch. 4). The basic needs
poverty line is roughly 20-25 percent higher than the food poverty line.
Table 5
Poverty elasticities in Tanzania
Stratum
Dar es Salaam Other urban Rural Mainland
Household Budget Survey, 1991
Food poverty -3.90 -1.05 -1.18 -1.46
Basic needs poverty -2.66 -0.84 -0.75 -0.69
Human Resource Development Survey, 1993
Food poverty -9.72 -5.29 -3.83 -3.14
Basic needs poverty -2.56 -1.14 -2.81 -1.45
Source: TAKWIMU (2000: Table 50).
6 Note that this does not have anything to do with the celebrated ‘Kuznets curve’, i.e., the observation
that a cross-country plot of some measure of inequality and per capita incomes will look like a U,
turned up-side down. Kuznets’ study was on a sample of countries and it has proved difficult to
generalize this observation (which is shaky as it is) to a time-series setting.9
Although the figures in Table 5 are surrounded by strong assumptions, several
interesting features stand out. First, the results differ substantially between the two
surveys. This is mainly due to differences in the expenditure distributions; generally, the
1991 Household Budget Survey is thought to provide the more realistic picture (i.e.,
results in later less comprehensive surveys are easier to reconcile with these).
Second, the impact of growth on poverty is different in different parts of the country. It
is not surprising, for instance, to find that the elasticities are substantially higher for Dar
es Salaam than for the rest of the country. What is a bit surprising, however, is that the
rural elasticity in the 1991 HBS is higher than that for other urban areas. Generally, one
would think that partial poverty elasticities (as the ones in Table 5) are higher (in
absolute terms) in urban areas.
Third, while reliable poverty elasticities are not abundantly available for African
countries, those that do exist suggest that the poverty impact of growth in Tanzania
(outside Dar es Salaam) is relatively low.7 This means that a relatively high rate of
growth is required to achieve a given reduction of poverty. This observation reinforces
the argument made above that high economic growth in Tanzania is absolutely
necessary to reduce poverty in a sustained manner.
However, as was noted above, the elasticities in Table 5 are valid only if income
distribution remain unchanged during growth. This is not realistic. Growth is by its
nature an uneven process, favouring certain sectors or regions (or groups of people)
over others. To take that into account, it is possible to calculate the rate of growth
required to achieve the objective of the national poverty eradication plan (on which the
projections in the poverty reduction strategy paper appear to be based): to halve poverty
by the year 2015. Using the results from the 1991 Household Budget Survey (which
appear to be the most reliable), we compare the baseline in Table 5 to two different
scenarios—one in which inequality increased, from 1991 and onwards, by one per cent
per annum and one in which inequality decreased by one per cent per annum. In both
cases, inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient for which 0 represents complete
equality and 1 complete inequality. The results are in Table 6.
The rationale for choosing these two scenarios is the following. Currently growth in
Tanzania is geared towards mining and tourism. Both these sectors are geographically
concentrated with limited linkages to the rest of the economy. If growth continues to be
driven by these sectors, an increase in inequality is likely to follow. If, on the other
hand, growth can be lead by small-holder agriculture, it is more likely to decrease
inequality: the rural areas in general, and subsistence agriculture in particular, contain
the majority of the poor. If they experience a disproportional growth of income, the Gini
coefficient is likely to fall.
The results are simulations and are thus indicative, and not to be interpreted to the letter.
In any case, the table gives an idea of the rates of growth necessary under various
assumptions. In addition, the current pattern of growth in Tanzania is perhaps such that
the scenario in which inequality increases is the most realistic and, finally, it should be
noted that required growth is very sensitive to what happens to inequality. In other
words, should inequality increase more than one per cent (say, two per cent per annum),
7 A selective survey of the literature is in Danielson (2001).10
required growth to halve basic needs poverty increases to over 9 per cent per annum in
real terms.
Table 6
Required annual real GDP growth to halve poverty by 2015,
three scenarios
Food poverty Basic needs poverty
One % increase in inequality p.a. 6.5% 8.2%
No change in inequality 4.9% 7.3%
One % decrease in inequality p.a. 3.3% 6.3%
Note: Calculations are based on the results from the 1991 Household Budget Survey. Inequality is
measured as the Gini coefficient. Population is estimated to grow at 2.8 % per annum.
Source: TAKWIMU (2000: Table 53).
3 Debt and debt relief under HIPC
3.1 Flow of debt under HIPC
While multilateral debt relief will lead to a substantial reduction of the existing debt
stock, Tanzania’s external financing gap remains, so external borrowing will continue.
Table 7 shows the impact of HIPC on debt servicing. In the current fiscal year, for
instance, the relief provided under the HIPC Initiative reduces debt servicing by almost
55 per cent. For instance, the US$ 169 million in debt service relief provided in
2001/02, corresponds to about 11 per cent of total government revenue in 2000 and is
more than the entire budget for the Ministry of Education.8
Note, however, from the table that the line ‘official bilateral’ included debt owed to
non-Paris Club countries, e.g., Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This debt is unlikely to be
serviced at the rate shown in the table. In fact, Tanzania has consistently accumulated
arrears on its non-Paris Club debt, and will continue to do so, the only exception to that
rule being a case in which those creditor countries offer new loans on attractive (i.e.,
IDA) terms in return for debt servicing.9 This leads to an increase in the short-term debt
stock, but the fact that non-payment of that debt is a conscious strategy has to be taken
into account when evaluating the size and evolution of the total debt stock.
Note also that while the multilateral debt accounts for the major part when it comes to
repayment of principal, the remaining bilateral, Paris Club debt accounts for the lion’s
share regarding interest payments. This, of course, is a reflection of the fact that
multilateral debt (from IMF, IDA and ADF) is provided at lower interest rate than most
bilateral debt. The fact that multilateral principal repayment is more dominant that
bilateral principal repayment reflects the fact that the HIPC Initiative entails a large
stock reduction of bilateral debt.
8 The Ministry of Education budget in 2000 was about TSh 120 billion, some US$ 135 million. Note,
however, that this cannot be used to gauge total spending on education: substantial amounts are
channelled through the Ministry of Local Government. Nevertheless, the example shows the resources
freed through debt relief are significant in relation to the government budget.
9 Interview with Peter Noni, Director of Economic Policy, Bank of Tanzania, 29 June 2001.11
Note finally that interest payment on new debt, i.e., debt contracted after the
commencement of HIPC in Tanzania, increases rapidly as share of total interest
payments, reaching one-quarter in 2004/05. This reflects the rapid accumulation of new
debt.
Some more details are in Table 8. The net present value of the debt that existed in 1999
declines from about US$ 1.7 billion in 1999/00 to an average of about US$ 1 billion in
2010-18. This means that HIPC relief is not ‘front-loaded’—most of the benefits are not
delivered early in the process and therefore it takes some years before there is a
significant reduction of the stock of ‘old’ debt. At the same time, new debt will be
accumulated. Given relatively generous assumptions on flows of grant aid, foreign
direct investments and export proceeds, the decision point document calculates this to
increase from US$ 200 million in 1999/00 to an average of almost US$ 5 billion in
2010/18 (all figures in net present value terms). In other words, Tanzania’s total debt in
2010 will be about three times as large as it was prior to the country getting HIPC relief.
The reason why this development is consistent with a move towards debt sustainability
is, of course, the assumption that the economy’s ability to carry a debt will grow over
time. Consequently, the assumption is that even though Tanzania in 1999/00 was unable
to carry a US$ 2 billion debt on its shoulders, the economy will, some fifteen years
later, be able to carry a debt three times as heavy. Focus, then, is on growth projections.
Table 7
Debt servicing after HIPC relief, US$ million
1999/00 (a 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Total debt service (b 235.5 153.3 141.8 143.8 148.5 158.2
Principal 167.4 97.5 82.3 80.4 81.4 81.4
Multilateral 83.2 47.8 30.2 25.9 42.2 53.9
Official bilateral 79.9 43 45.5 47.9 36.3 27.4
o/w: Paris club 61.4 23.1 28.2 31 24.6 23.3
Commercial 4.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 3.4 0
Interest 66.2 56.3 63.4 66.6 70.4 74.5
Multilateral 19.9 13.3 10.3 8.6 9.1 9.1
Official bilateral 43.4 33.4 38.8 37.3 35.9 35.1
o/w: Paris club 39.5 27.3 30.2 32.4 31.6 30.9
Commercial 1.0 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.4
New debt 3.1 8 12.3 16.8 21.2 25.5
Total debt service (c 295 317.8 310.9 362.7 258.8 259
Debt service ratio (c 24.8 24.6 20.9 25.6 13.7 12.5








Source: IMF/IDA (2000: Table 12).12
Table 8
Net present value (NPV) of external debt after rescheduling, selected years
(US$ million unless otherwise indicated)
Averages
1999/00 2002/03 2005/06 1999/09 2010/18
NPV of total debt 1,876.9 2,616.6 3,279.0 2,943.5 5,885.4
NPV of old debt 1,674.5 1,570.7 1,510.0 1,553.2 1,041.6
NPV of new debt 202.4 959.0 1,768.7 1,390.5 4,843.8
Debt-to-export (a 165.4 174.9 154.8 163.3 141.8
Note: (a NPV of debt stock to three-year average of export proceeds. For 1999/00 this includes
interim relief and relief to be delivered at completion point. Since the completion point was
not reached in 1999/00, it implies that the actual debt-to-export ratio in that year was higher
than what is depicted in the table.
Source: IMF/IDA (2000: 32).
3.2 History and projections
The debt sustainability analysis (DSA) in the decision point document contains a
number of explicit assumptions used to derive the conclusion of Tanzania’s move
towards a sustainable position under the HIPC Initiative. For the argument of this paper,
three assumptions are of particular relevance:
- Real GDP growth increases to 5.5 per cent in 2001, to 6 per cent in 2002 and
remains there throughout the period;
- Real proceeds from traditional exports grow at 4-6% per annum throughout the
period;
- The export-to-GDP ratio increases from 13.6 per cent in 1999 to 18 per cent in
2015.
While it is rather difficult to reconcile the figures in the decision point document with
those officially published by Tanzanian authorities, it is nevertheless possible to make
some interesting inferences. Using IMF data, Table 9 shows the historical performance
of GDP and exports. It suggests that there is little in recent history to motivate such
projections. Moreover, some of the implied projections in the DSA appear extremely
unrealistic, particularly in view of the fact that they relate to the average annual growth
rate during an extended period of time. Here is an example.
Table 9
GDP and exports; real growth rates except as indicated
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 HIPC projection (a
GDP 3.6 4.2 3.3 4.0 4.7 6.0
GNFS exports 17.4 14.1 -22.8 -11.8 0.1 13-18
o/w: traditional 12.8 0.5 -2.5 -23.0 -9.4 4-6
non-traditional 24.4 33.3 -44.6 9.4 12.6 21-27
Export ratio (b 22.6 20.9 16.0 15.6 15.9 18.0
Notes: (a Annual averages, 2000-2018.
(b Total exports as percentage of GDP.
Source: IMF (2000: Tables 1, 7 and 18); last column from IMF/IDA (2000).13
According to BoT (2000: Table 4.4), traditional exports in 1999 were about 51 per cent
of total exports; non-traditional exports—petroleum products, manufactures, and
minerals—accounted for 49 per cent. With a GDP in 1999 of TSh 4,322 billion, total
export proceeds (given the export ratio in the DSA) were TSh 587 billion. Of this,
proceeds from traditional export amounted to about TSh 300 billion. Now, the
projections in the DSA imply that (in real prices) GDP in 2015 will be some TSh 10,980
billion and traditional exports (assuming annual growth of five per cent) TSh 658
billion. However, to reach an export-to-GDP of 18 per cent, total exports would have to
be TSh 1,976 billion, so non-traditional exports would have to be TSh 1,318 billion,
which represents a growth rate, between 2000 and 2018, of over 24 per cent per
annum.10
The DSA projections give the minimum growth rates compatible with a sustainable debt
position in 2018; a short-fall in GDP growth implies a higher debt ratio and lower-than-
projected export growth implies either slower growth (through import compression) or a
more rapid accumulation of debt (if the external gap is financed through loans.
One such example is provided in the analysis by the US General Accounting Office
(GAO 2000). Here, the decision point DSA calculations are taken as the base-case, and
compared to situations in which export proceeds fall short of projections with one and
two percentage points, respectively. In addition, GAO (2000: 54-6) considers two
scenarios: one in which the increased external gap is financed by loans (on IDA terms)
and grants in equal proportions and one in which the entire increase in the external gap
is financed through increased borrowing (again on IDA terms). Table 10 shows the
results.
Consequently, if projections are not realized, the country will probably not be able to
reach debt sustainability at the end of the HIPC period. It deserves to be pointed out that
failure to reach sustainability is not necessarily a consequence of inappropriate policies;
unrealistic projections are another plausible cause. One interesting question in this
regard, of course, is, what happens if the country fails to reach sustainability? The HIPC
Initiative is supposed to be a ‘final exit’—a one-time opportunity for getting rid of the
debt. However, unless very optimistic projections are met, Tanzania may find itself in a
new debt trap a few decades into the new millennium, despite massive reductions in the
now existing debt. It is noticeable that only little thought appears to have been devoted
to this issue, at least in the officially available documentation.
Table 10
NPV debt-to-export ratio in 2017/18 under alternative assumptions
Loans and grants Loans
Base case 137 137
One percentage point fall in export proceeds 200 236
Two percentage points fall in export proceeds 280 358
Note: The base case corresponds to the IMF/IDA debt sustainability analysis. A sustainable debt is
defined as a NPV of debt-to-exports to no more that 150 per cent.
Source: GAO (2000: Table 4), Table 4.
10 The required average annual rate of growth on non-traditional exports varies, of course, with the
projected growth rate of traditional exports: from 21 per cent per annum when traditional exports
grow at six per cent per annum to 27 per cent when the growth rate of traditional exports is four per
cent.14
4 Concluding remarks
While in theory debt reduction may affect the economy favourably in three different
ways, the HIPC Initiative seems most promising when it comes to the flow effect—the
impact on social spending of the freeing of government resources. As for policies, the
high dependence of Tanzania on external resources and the determination of the current
president seem to suggest that policy reversals are not a major threat to the current
situation. And as for the stock effect—that debt reduction can increase growth through
increased private investments, improved credit ratings or other channels—these are not
given much prominence in the HIPC strategy.
But still growth is very important—not as an outcome of the HIPC process but rather as
an input: without rapid economic growth, Tanzania will not be able to reach a
sustainable debt position, given the size of the debt reductions and the projected future
need of international borrowing. It is an open question how this growth—at the range of
8-9 per cent per annum for more than a decade—is going to be accomplished.
The major message of this paper is that macroeconomic projections may be useful—but
only if they are based on a realistic assessment of the constraints facing the economy.
This is probably not the case for the debt sustainability analysis of Tanzania, and the
issue to be addressed is how growth can be speeded up and the acute problem of poverty
speedily attacked.
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